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3. Nicaraguan food policy: between 
self-sufficiency and dependency
Christiane Berth
During the celebrations for World Food Day 2015 in Nicaragua, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) representative, Verónica Guerrero Rodríguez, highlighted the fact that by significantly reducing 
malnutrition, Nicaragua was among the few countries to have achieved the first 
UN Millennium Goal.1 In fact, the percentage of undernourished people in the 
country had decreased from 54.4 per cent in 1990 to 16.6 per cent in 2015.2 
After Daniel Ortega returned to power in 2006, the government launched a 
number of programmes to improve the country’s nutritional situation, such as 
the Zero Hunger Program and the Healthy Patios Project. Some of these projects 
revived concepts from the early 1980s, when the Sandinistas had adopted a 
highly ambitious food policy that attracted the attention of the international 
nutrition community. The Sandinista government’s apparent success since 2006 
contrasts sharply with the deterioration of the Sandinista food policy in the late 
1980s. By 1990, when the Sandinistas lost the elections, the nutritional situation 
in the country was disastrous.
In this chapter, I argue that the Sandinistas’ continuous struggle with 
economic dependency impeded the revolutionaries’ attempts to make Nicaragua 
more self-sufficient. Despite the reforms of the early 1980s, including a new 
food distribution system, agrarian reform and price regulation, food production 
did not advance as quickly as the revolutionaries had hoped. Consequently, 
Nicaragua continued to depend on food imports and, when foreign exchange 
became scarce, relied increasingly on food aid. With the looming economic 
crisis in the mid 1980s, the gap between political propaganda and social realities 
increased. The Contra War and the US economic blockade, as well as the 
Sandinistas’ political strategies in the countryside, contributed to shortages that 
undermined the self-sufficiency project. In the end, the Sandinista government 
opted for a strategy of ‘economic adjustment’ which reversed some of the 
1 The aim of this Millennium Goal was to halve the proportion of people suffering from hunger 
between 1990 and 2015. 
2 H. Montez Rugama, ‘FAO elogia lucha contra el hambre’, El Nuevo Diario, 8 Oct. 2015.
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important social reforms of the early 1980s. By 1988, hunger was back in 
Nicaragua, when average caloric intakes fell below the levels documented by 
nutritional surveys in 1953–54.3 
Some researchers have argued that the disastrous nutritional situation was 
the result of neoliberal economic policies in the early 1990s.4 This chapter, 
however, proposes a somewhat different interpretation. The failure to guarantee 
Nicaraguans a stable food supply in the second half of the 1980s contributed 
to the demise of the Sandinista Revolution. The disastrous nutritional situation 
then worsened further with the elimination of free healthcare, the introduction 
of neoliberal economic policies, and the neglect of small landholders by the post-
1990 Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) government. Despite a slight reduction 
in the late 1990s, poverty rates remained extremely high until 2005, when they 
were 48.3 per cent, and then began to decrease from 2006 onwards.5
Despite the setbacks of the 1980s, the revolutionary experience laid the 
foundations for an approach to food policy that is, in some ways, distinctive. 
The Sandinista Revolution left a legacy of peasant networks that reorganised in 
the 1990s and mobilised for improvements in the Nicaraguan countryside. The 
Nicaraguan section of La Vía Campesina (LVC) evolved out of these networks 
and campaigned for a food sovereignty law in Nicaragua.
Although the food sovereignty approach reprised some important elements 
of the Sandanistas’ 1980s food policy, the new setting is different. The Ortega 
government is unwilling to challenge the private sector and has therefore 
subordinated demands for the restriction of food imports to the regulations 
of trade agreements. While several of the new programmes resemble the 1980s 
projects in name, they are conducted in a different political context: the new 
caudillismo or ‘populist left regime with hybrid economic features’6 that Ortega 
has established in Nicaragua since 2007. In this chapter, I evaluate Sandinista 
food policy across three periods: the expansive, ambitious food policy of the 
3 M. Flores et al., ‘Estudios dietéticos en Nicaragua: I. Municipio de San Isidro, Departamento 
de Matagalpa’; M. Flores, ‘Estudios dietéticos en Nicaragua: II. Barrio de San Luis, Ciudad de 
Managua’.
4 S. Linkogle, ‘Soya, culture and international food aid: the case of a Nicaraguan communal 
kitchen’, 97; W. Godek, ‘The institutionalization of food sovereignty, PhD diss., Rutgers 
University, 2014, 164–5.
5 Poverty decreased from 50.3 per cent of the population in 1993 to 47.9 per cent in 1998 
to 45.8 per cent in 2001. R. Spalding, ‘Poverty politics’, 221–2; A. Acevedo Vogl, ‘Estamos 
en un punto de inflexión y deberíamos preocuparnos’, Envío, no. 404, Nov. 2015. The last 
survey on living standards conducted by INIDE (Instituto Nacional de Información de 
Desarrollo) claimed that poverty had decreased from 42.5 per cent in 2009 to 29.6 per cent 
in 2014. However, economist Adolfo Acevedo Vogl criticised the definition of poverty used 
by the survey (i.e. daily expenditure of less than US$1.81), suggesting it was too low. The 
World Bank has amended its definition of poverty for Latin America to include all those with 
a daily expenditure of less than US$4. In addition, INIDE has not published the database for 
the survey. A FIDEG (Fundación Internacional para el Desafío Económico Global) survey 
concluded that in 2013 the poverty level was still 40.5 per cent of the population. FIDEG, 
‘Dinámicas de la pobreza en Nicaragua 2009–2013’, 2014, 4.
6 R.J. Spalding, Contesting Trade in Central America: Market Reform and Resistance, 208.
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first years after the revolution (1979–82), the period of crisis and adjustment 
(1984–8) and the period of erosion (1988–90). In the last section, I discuss 
continuities and discontinuities in the neo-Sandinista food policy after 2007. 
Research on food sovereignty in Nicaragua has provided important insights into 
the politics around food during the last decade. Nevertheless, I propose that there 
is a need for a broader analysis which incorporates agrarian change, consumption 
and food distribution to explain both the reduction of malnutrition and its 
continuing prevalence in rural Nicaragua today. 
Initial euphoria, 1979–82
The slogan ‘Let’s all sow the land’, which appeared on a Nicaraguan Food Program 
poster, called on people to participate in food production. The illustration shows 
a peasant couple with the man holding his machete triumphantly aloft, while 
the woman holds a basket of vegetables on her arm. This poster formed part of 
early Sandinista campaigns to increase food production in Nicaragua.7 Projects 
in the early 1980s set ambitious goals: the aim was to reach self-sufficiency by 
1982 – and this in a country where food imports had increased significantly in 
the decades prior to revolution. 
‘It may be concluded that the theme of FOOD and especially that of 
National Food Self-Sufficiency and Food Security is considered to have a 
very high political priority in contemporary Nicaragua’ was how Otto van 
Teutem, FAO representative in Nicaragua, ended his report on World Food 
Day in 1982.8 His statement demonstrates that the international organisations 
working in Nicaragua also saw the new energy with which the Sandinistas 
were pursuing their revolutionary food policy. It aimed at guaranteeing a basic 
food supply to all Nicaraguans and was based on four pillars: 1) the increase of 
basic grain production; 2) the promotion of local food consumption; 3) the 
democratisation of the supply system; and 4) the regulation of prices. Up to 
1982, the revolutionaries created new institutions, invested more resources, 
developed ambitious production schemes and launched broad-based education 
campaigns. In general, the Sandinistas promoted a ‘mixed economy’, with 
three sectors: private enterprise, mixed firms and a state sector. In contrast with 
other revolutionary regimes, they refrained from a complete nationalisation of 
production.9
During the period of initial euphoria, the Sandinistas introduced credits for 
basic grain producers, democratised the supply system, and mobilised people 
to consume locally produced food. The new distribution network, managed 
by the Empresa Nacional de Alimentos Básicos (ENABAS), included popular 
stores, rural distribution points and popular supermarkets. External aggression 
7 The poster is reprinted in O. Núñez Soto, ‘Unser Land: unsere Revolution’, 104. 
8 O. van Teutem, ‘Report on World Food Day 1982 – Nicaragua, 2 Nov. 1982’. ESH WFD IN 
4/9 NIC, FAO Archives.
9 R. Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio de economía nicaragüense: las raíces del presente, 54–55; J. 
Austin, et al., ‘The role of the revolutionary state in the Nicaraguan food system’. 
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played a key role in expanding these ambitious reforms. Shortly after taking 
over the US presidency in January 1981, Ronald Reagan announced that his 
government would cancel credits for wheat imports from Nicaragua. Soon 
afterwards, in May 1981, the Sandinistas launched the Nicaraguan Food 
Program (PAN) to coordinate Nicaragua’s new food policy.10 The cancellation 
of the wheat credits also sparked the first campaign to promote corn as an anti-
imperialist, revolutionary food. The campaigns included visual references, 
Mesoamerican legends, cooking competitions and songs. The first corn festivals 
mobilised thousands of Nicaraguans around local food security.11 More than 
30 years later my interviewees remembered the campaigns with enthusiasm.12 
At the same time, government propaganda increasingly promoted the aim of 
self-sufficiency. In late 1981, PAN director Pedro Antonio Blandón announced 
that Nicaragua planned to reach self-sufficiency in basic grains by 1982.13 To 
stimulate food production in the cities, the Sandinistas also launched an urban 
gardening campaign.
The global nutrition community observed Nicaraguan efforts with interest. 
After the world food crisis in the early 1970s, there was intense debate about the 
correct approach to global nutritional problems. The Sandinista revolutionaries 
attracted attention because they prioritised basic grain production and seemed 
willing to change land distribution structures as well as invest resources in 
improving the nutrition of the poor. Consequently, the FAO, WHO and 
UNICEF financed a large number of nutritional projects during the 1980s. 
Their work, as well as the general interest shown in Nicaragua’s policy, attracted 
many people from the nutritional community to the country. They combined 
work at Sandinista institutions with research on the food system. For example, 
Solon Barraclough the US economist and UN Research Institute for Social 
Development (UNRISD) director, initiated a collaboration that shaped the work 
of the Nicaraguan research centre, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios de la 
Reforma Agraria (CIERA).14 Conceived of as a research institution to support 
agrarian reform and food policy, the centre applied UNRISD’s food system 
methodology in many of its surveys.
As the Sandinista government began to cooperate closely with the FAO in the 
early 1980s, food security was incorporated in Nicaraguan policy. Moreover, the 
FAO supported several projects under its Food Security Assistance Program.15 
10 Although the programme’s symbol was the corncob, the organisation’s acronym is the Spanish 
word for bread. 
11 Barricada, ‘Xilonem, respuesta y compromiso’, 12 May 1981, 3.
12 Interview, María Josefina Gurdián Mántica (Doña Piñita), Managua, Aug. 2012. Interview, 
Rosario Montes Orozco, León, Sept. 2012.
13 P. Candia, ‘El proyecto PAN trascendencia y obstáculos’, Barricada, 20 June 1981, 3; 
Barricada, ‘Consigna del PAN, producir’, 22 June 1981, 1, 7; Barricada, ‘Blandón evalúa 5 
meses del PAN’, 28 Sept. 1981, 1, 5; Barricada, ‘PAN, unificar políticas en 1982’, 16 Dec. 
1981, 5.
14 S. Barraclough, A Preliminary Analysis of the Nicaraguan Food System (Genf, 1982).
15 E. Saouma to J. Wheelock, 1 Sept. 1981. FA 13/1 FSAS ODG Old, FAO Archives.
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At international conferences, Nicaragua suggested the establishment of a regional 
Food Security Council built on Latin American solidarity and intra-regional 
trade.16 In internal political debates, however, the concept of self-sufficiency 
remained more significant. In 1987, the Nicaraguan Constitution addressed the 
issue of food security, asserting the right of Nicaraguans to be protected against 
hunger, backed up by state guarantees for adequate availability and equitable 
distribution.17 In the political discourse of Nicaragua in the 1980s, the term ‘food 
sovereignty’ did not appear. However, some elements of Sandinista food policy 
anticipated demands subsequently raised by the food sovereignty movement. 
These were the emphasis on local consumption and production, agrarian reform, 
and the right to define the local food system autonomously.18
The first publications by international experts reflected contemporary 
enthusiasm and presented Nicaragua as a model for other countries of the Global 
South. For example, Joseph Collins, founder of the US initiative Food First, held 
up Nicaragua as a model for countries that lacked large budget resources for their 
food policy.19 James Austin et al. concluded that ‘in spite of extremely adverse 
circumstances … the Sandinista Revolution has made significant achievements 
in the areas of food policy and agricultural development’.20 However, the experts 
were also aware that these ambitious projects faced enormous challenges.
The new food policy faced two main obstacles: first, the structure of the 
Nicaraguan economy was highly dependent on agro exports, and, second, the 
policies of the Somoza dictatorship had reinforced this dependency. In particular, 
cotton cultivation had expanded in Pacific Nicaragua, taking up the best soils 
from the 1950s on. By contrast, basic grain production had moved to the inferior 
soils of the Nicaraguan interior.21 When the Sandinistas came to power in July 
16 FAO, Report of the Seventeenth FAO Regional Conference for Latin America: Managua, 30 
August to 10 September 1982.
17 Article 63: ‘Es derecho de los nicaragüenses estar protegidos contra el hambre. El Estado 
promoverá programas que aseguren una adecuada disponibilidad de alimentos y 
una distribución equitativa de los mismos’, Constitución política de 1987, http://
legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni/normaweb.nsf/bbe90a5bb646d50906257265005d21f8/ 
8339762d0f427a1c062573080055fa46?OpenDocument
18 See, e.g., the 2016 definition on La Vía Campesina’s homepage: ‘Food sovereignty prioritises 
local food production and consumption. It gives a country the right to protect its local 
producers from cheap imports and to control production. It ensures that the rights to use and 
manage lands, territories, water, seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those 
who produce food and not of the corporate sector. Therefore, the implementation of genuine 
agrarian reform is one of the top priorities of the farmer’s movement’: https://web.archive.org/
web/20160305031659/http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/organisation-mainmenu-44.
19 Solon Barraclough argued similarily that ‘the Nicaraguan experience in dealing with its 
food problems will probably be highly relevant for some other Central American countries’. 
A Preliminary Analysis, 11.
20 Austin et al., ‘The role of the revolutionary state’; 35.
21 Between 1960 and 1979, cotton exports increased by 381 per cent, beef exports by 335 per 
cent and sugar exports by 349 per cent. B.N. Biondi-Morra, Revolución y política alimentaria: 
Un análisis crítico de Nicaragua, 49, 57–9; Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio, 29, 35–9; J.A. 
Booth, The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution, 60–6.
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1979, the initial situation they faced was unfavourable. The civil war of the late 
1970s had brought food production to a standstill, making food supply during 
the insurrectional period difficult. Consequently, the revolutionary government’s 
first priority was to resume food production.
In the countryside, many peasants hoped that agrarian reform would follow 
immediately after the revolution, allowing them to produce on their own land. 
However, the first wave of Sandinista expropriation favoured large state farms 
instead of individual peasant production. In 1979, the Sandinistas transformed 
the enterprise and landholdings of the Somoza family and National Guard 
officers into state enterprises that would continue export production to earn 
foreign currency but would also increase basic grain production to ensure local 
supply. By contrast, after the enactment of the first agrarian reform law in 
1981, land distributions proceeded slowly. During the first period up to 1984, 
cooperatives benefited most, receiving more than 80 per cent of all distributed 
land. Many peasants who had dreamt for a long time of possessing their own 
land felt betrayed.22 At the same time, relations between peasants and ENABAS 
suffered from problems concerning the new system of guaranteed prices the 
latter had introduced. For example, peasants considered prices offered for basic 
grains to be too low as inflation was on the rise. Next, trading with ENABAS 
had its disadvantages because the enterprise paid by cheque instead of cash. Since 
local banks could not always cash cheques, this often meant that peasants had 
to travel further afield.23
Although theoretically basic grain production took absolute priority, the 
need for foreign exchange undermined the food policy agenda. The Nicaraguan 
economy depended strongly on the export of cotton, coffee and sugar, the result 
of which was that the government had to support their production in order to 
secure foreign currency. The resources assigned to agro-export enterprises meant 
that basic grain production received insufficient assistance, because of the general 
scarcity of agricultural inputs. In addition, export agriculture and basic grain 
production also competed for labour.24 
The first evaluations by the Sandinistas of the new food policy showed 
mixed results: agricultural production still faced difficulties, as Figure 1 below 
demonstrates. In particular, corn production had declined after 1978. Although 
it recovered with the 1980/81 harvest, corn production did not reach pre-
war levels again until the late 1980s. The production of beans and rice also 
recovered in the early 1980s, but not sufficiently to keep up with the increasing 
demands of a growing population. This gap is reflected in the first surveys on 
post-revolutionary consumption.
22 E. Dore, ‘The great grain dilemma. Peasants and state policy in revolutionary Nicaragua’, 
102–4, 115–17; E. Baumeister, Estructura y reforma agraria en Nicaragua (1979–1989), 123.
23 A.H. Saulniers, ‘State trading organizations in expansion: a case study of ENABAS’, 119; S. 
Martí i Puig, ‘The origins of the peasant-Contra rebellion in Nicaragua, 1979–87’, 12.
24 L.J. Enríquez, Harvesting Change: Labor and Agrarian Reform in Nicaragua 1979–1990, 84–5.
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Surveys conducted in the early 1980s reveal the mixed results of the 
Sandinista food policy: despite increasing per capita consumption of basic 
foodstuffs, people judged their nutritional situation to be worse after the 
revolution. It must be noted that the surveys encountered many difficulties, 
such as the limited availability of updated statistical data on the population, 
basic grain production and income. CIERA’s first investigation in 1982 into 
popular consumption in ten Managuan districts revealed discontent among the 
inhabitants. Taking meat as the main indicator of good nutrition, more than 
40 per cent of the interviewees contended that their nutrition had worsened in 
the previous two years and only 8 per cent believed that their diets were better.25 
While this was certainly true in terms of meat consumption, the supply of rice, 
wheat flour and eggs had improved.26 The supply of basic foods also increased 
as the government subsidised the cost of basic grains, sugar, milk and vegetable 
oil until 1984. It was the first time in Nicaraguan history that a government had 
distributed subsidised food on such a large scale.27
Throughout the 1980s, revolutionary propaganda revalorised traditional 
Nicaraguan food against imported ingredients and processed food. 
Contemporary surveys on consumption indicate limited success, however. In the 
early 1980s, people in the poor districts of Managua still spent considerable 
25 Centro de Investigación y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria (CIERA), Distribución y consumo 
popular de alimentos en Managua, 78.
26 Barricada published data on per capita consumption between 1977 and 1982, based on 
MIDINRA (Ministerio de Desarrollo Agropecuario y Reforma Agraria) and MICOIN 
(Ministerio de Comercio Interior) data. These statistics show a decline in per capita milk 
consumption while other data indicate an improvement. In general, statistical information 
from the revolutionary years is sometimes contradictory. Especially in the years of economic 
crisis, the scope of surveys remained limited. See C.M. Vilas, ‘Nicaragua. I. Scientific research 
in a revolutionary setting. The case of Nicaragua’, 11–13, 54–55.
27 Data on rural consumption are scarce, but the few existing surveys indicate that peasants 
could supply themselves with meat and basic grains. However, the lack of tools and the other 
means necessary to undertake daily work affected their living conditions and prompted 
discontent.
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sums of money on processed food such as Maggi soup or biscuits. Similarly, 
the demand for milk powder remained high throughout the 1980s.28 The 
government promoted fish as a healthy alternative to meat, frescos beverages 
instead of soft drinks, and corn instead of wheat. In the early 1980s people 
attended corn festivals in large numbers, started urban gardening projects 
and developed creative substitutes for scarce products. Nevertheless, it proved 
difficult to make comprehensive changes to Nicaraguans’ consumption habits. 
Some advances were made with the introduction of new staples such as soy and 
potatoes, production of which was stimulated by development projects, and to 
an extent their consumption improved local diets during the crisis of the late 
1980s.29
By the time CIERA published the results of the consumer survey in 1983, 
the situation in Nicaragua had worsened: from 1981, the US began supporting 
armed opponents of the revolution – the Contras – who attacked Nicaragua 
from their bases on its borders. The Contra War demanded resources that 
could otherwise have been spent on social projects. It also affected basic grain 
production: in the war zones storage and infrastructure were destroyed and 
peasants displaced.30 Worse still, prices of Nicaragua’s most important export 
products on the world markets fell, which led to a deep financial crisis.
Ongoing dependency and the turn to economic  
adjustment, 1984–8
With the Contra War and the looming financial crisis, dependency and scarcity 
became ever more visible in Nicaraguan society. By 1985, military expenditure 
made up 50 per cent of the national budget. Due to US pressure, many 
international financial institutions had blocked funding for Nicaragua. At the 
same time, prices for agrarian export products remained low, which exacerbated 
the scarcity of foreign currency. There had been shortages of basic grains since the 
early 1980s, reinforced by natural disaster, but in 1984 the situation worsened. 
The Nicaraguan economy became a ‘shortage economy’31 and this had many 
negative consequences for Nicaraguan consumers, who had to bear the time-
consuming search for food and the erosion of real wages. Long lines formed 
outside shops and frequently consumers were unable to acquire basic products 
28 Centro de Investigación y Estudios de la Reforma Agraria, Distribución y consumo popular, 
12–13.
29 On potatoes, see Evaluación externa. Retrospectiva y prospectiva del proyecto agropecuario 
MAG-COSUDE. Estelí, Nicaragua, 10–22 June 1991. E2025A#2002/145#2338, 
Bundesarchiv Bern; on soy, see H. Simon, ‘Probleme und Perspektiven von Frauenförderung 
vor dem sozio-ökonomischen Hintergrund Nicaraguas, 128–48.
30 T.W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle, 92–5.
31 The term was coined by the economist János Kornai, who analysed the historical development 
of economies in central, eastern and south-eastern Europe from the 1950s. It refers to chronic 
shortage of important goods as a result of the economy’s structure. B. Tomka, A Social History 
of Twentieth Century Europe, 242. Even if the Nicaraguan economy was not entirely planned, 
structural problems caused the lack of products available to consumers.
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such as sugar, wheat, toilet paper or soap. In 1984, Managuan supermarkets 
reported the first violent protests by consumers, who smashed windows to gain 
access to food.32 Simultaneously, black markets witnessed rapid growth. In 
Managua, informal trade was concentrated at the largest Managuan market, the 
Oriental, where speculators offered scarce goods at exorbitant prices. By 1984, 
the Sandinistas had intensified control measures, for example, by introducing 
a consumer card system for the distribution of rice, beans, salt, sugar, corn, oil, 
soap and matches.
As outlined above, agricultural production had not advanced sufficiently 
to guarantee a basic grain supply to all Nicaraguans. By 1983, the lack of 
foreign currency further undermined production as the government was facing 
serious difficulties in importing necessary agricultural inputs, such as tools and 
fertilisers. This shortage was particularly acute for technology-based crops, such 
as rice, whose production fell significantly between 1983 and 1986. The growing 
dependency on imports and food aid went, paradoxically, hand in hand with 
a radicalisation of the discourse on self-sufficiency. For instance, the FSLN 
newspaper Barricada characterised urban gardens as ‘trenches against hunger’.33 
In illustrations, peasants’ tools were portrayed as weapons, which is indicative of 
the militarisation of political propaganda in the mid 1980s.34 
A closer look at rural communities reveals, however, that the countryside did 
not fight unconditionally at the Sandinistas’ side, either in the military conflict or 
in agricultural production.35 This was the result of the contradictory Sandinista 
agrarian policy during the early revolutionary years. The Agrarian Reform 
Law resulted in very little land being distributed to small peasants, because 
Sandinista elites at the agriculture ministry favoured large-scale agriculture. They 
designed huge, spectacular projects that failed to address Nicaraguan realities.36 
By contrast, advocates of a small peasants strategy formed the majority at 
CIERA, but their arguments were not heard until it became apparent that more 
peasants were supporting the Contras. By the mid 1980s, the Sandinistas had 
accelerated land distribution, were paying higher prices for basic grains, and had 
implemented a new rural supply network.37
To alleviate the general supply situation, the government relied increasingly 
on external food aid, a trend set in 1981, when more than 77.3 million tons of 
food were received. Throughout the decade, wheat, corn and rice were the most 
32 Barricada, ‘Abastecimiento irregular en barrio Bello Horizonte’, 17 Aug. 1984, 10.
33 Translation from Spanish original. Barricada, ‘Huertos: lucha contra el hambre y el bloqueo’, 
3 June 1985, 3.
34 See, e.g., Barricada, ‘Trabajo y defensa ... un solo frente de combate’, 10 June 1985, 8.
35 I.A. Luciak, The Sandinista Legacy: Lessons from a Political Economy in Transition, 123–4; L. 
Horton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994, 158–60.
36 S. Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos: A Memoir of the Sandinista Revolution, 168. Joseph Collins 
had expressed similar fears in the mid 1980s in Nicaragua: Was hat sich durch die Revolution 
verändert? Agrarreform und Ernährung im neuen Nicaragua, with the assistance of F. Moore 
Lappé et al, 148–51.
37 Luciak, The Sandinista Legacy, 124–31; E. Baumeister, ‘Agrarian reform’, 239–40.
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important donated products. This made it possible to guarantee supply quotas at 
times of difficulty, but it also silently undermined Nicaragua’s policy of becoming 
more independent from external aid. Between 1982 and 1984, western European 
governments, Canada and the European Economic Community (EEC) provided 
large amounts of aid, while food donations from socialist countries increased 
significantly after 1983, and had become the most important source of aid by 
1984.38 This reflects a general shift in external aid for the revolutionary project. 
On the one hand, the United States exercised diplomatic pressure that made even 
strong allies cave in to their demands. On the other, early enthusiasm was fading. 
Some European governments criticised Sandinista policy as undemocratic and 
thus reduced their economic aid considerably.39 Although, owing to Socialist 
support, the total amount of aid remained more or less stable, Sandinista leaders 
were continuously seeking to acquire new sources, which also meant adapting 
to donors’ agendas.40 For example, the Sandinistas never publicly criticised the 
FAO and incorporated the international organisation’s self-image into Sandinista 
political propaganda. In the end, food aid strengthened the demand for wheat 
products and powdered milk, which further weakened the self-sufficiency 
project. In spite of some voices expressing concern about external dependency, 
in most cases the Sandinistas glorified the aid in public ceremonies as a way of 
demonstrating their strong international reputation. For example, while they 
idealised East German food aid as an expression of proletarian internationalism, 
archival documentation reveals a clear struggle for influence in Cold War 
terrain.41 Moreover, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) hoped to acquire 
Nicaraguan export products, such as coffee, that could help to alleviate its supply 
problems.42 As the economic crisis became ever more visible, GDR consultants 
commented critically on the lack of adequate economic strategies.43
In fact, by 1983, conflicts on the future of Nicaragua’s economic policy had 
emerged. Faced with a lack of access to foreign currency, Sandinista politicians 
began to question whether an expansive social policy was still possible. This 
contentious discussion among political leaders and experts lasted for several 
38 R. Garst, La ayuda alimentaria al istmo centroamericano, Colección Temas de Seguridad 
Alimentaria 13 (Panamá, 1992), cuadro 15. The data are based on the statistics from the 
Nicaraguan Ministry of Exterior Cooperation.
39 K. Christiaens, ‘Between diplomacy and solidarity: western European support networks for 
Sandinista Nicaragua’, 21 (4) (2014).
40 S. Barraclough et al., Aid that Counts: The Western Contribution to Development and Survival in 
Nicaragua, 73.
41 Barricada, ‘RDA entrega el trigo donado’, 9 June 1981, 1, 5. Documentation from German 
state archives reveals that the GDR competed eagerly with Federal Germany to provide food 
aid, as diplomats from both German states saw this as a means of portraying a positive image 
of their political system. Each carefully observed every step their rivals made. 
42 This expectation was not entirely fulfilled as Nicaragua could not deliver all the promised 
products during the mid 1980s.
43 Müller, Bericht über die Beratertätigkeit Monat Jan./Feb. 1985, 11.2.1985; Müller, Bericht 
über die Beratertätigkeit im Zeitraum November/Dezember 1984, 10.12.1984. BArch DE 
1/58123.
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years. Alejandro Martínez-Cuenca, foreign trade minister, favoured an 
adjustment solution, while others still dwelt on structuralist approaches. With 
elections in 1984, they postponed making a decision until 1985, when the first 
signs of hyperinflation were already becoming visible. In February 1985, the 
Sandinistas launched the first economic adjustment package, including budget 
cuts, the elimination of most food subsidies, increased taxes and a devaluation of 
the Nicaraguan currency. With the new economic strategy, food policy became 
less important.44
While external advisers’ early publications about Nicaragua’s food policy 
had been overwhelmingly positive, by the mid 1980s their evaluations had 
become more critical. Joseph Collins’ third, extended version of his book, 
published in 1986, openly expressed his disillusionment. First, he argued, food 
policy was no longer a political priority. Next, he strongly criticised the reliance 
on technology and large-scale production which meant that small producers 
received only limited technological support. Finally, he said, PAN suffered from 
bureaucratic chaos, inadequately educated staff and a lack of resources.45 By that 
point, researchers’ interest in publishing on Sandinista food policy had also faded 
away. Although basic elements of the policy, such as the distribution system, still 
existed, the economic crisis weakened the system’s capacities. The Sandinistas 
launched increasingly militant campaigns blaming external enemies, such as the 
speculators, for the scarcity of goods.
The erosion of Sandinista food policy, 1988–90
The situation steadily worsened in the second half of the 1980s. Between 
1985 and 1987, Nicaraguans faced an 85 per cent erosion of real wages. The 
government was incapable of halting inflation, which reached 747 per cent 
in 1986; 1,347 per cent in 1987 and 33,000 in 1988.46 The crisis eroded the 
country’s food policy and the capacity to store and manage food donations.
Many products were not available through official supply channels, obliging 
people either to search for substitutes or pay exorbitant prices on the black 
market. In spite of all the Sandinistas’ efforts to bring the Managuan Oriental 
market under control, informal trade continued to grow, as official wages did 
not keep up with inflation. Many state employees reduced their working hours 
so as to engage in other survival activities. Criticism grew hand-in-hand with 
eroding living standards, eventually even by the FSLN newspaper in 1987. 
Several writers, such as the Nicaraguan poet Gioconda Belli, rejected the official 
interpretation that speculation was the main enemy of the revolution and 
suggested the reintroduction of food subsidies.47
44 A. Martínez Cuenca, Sandinista Economies in Practice, 65–6; Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos, 
166; Sola Montserrat, Un siglo y medio, 100–1; J. Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 247–73.
45 Collins, Nicaragua, 154–64.
46 Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 261; D. Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 128–9.
47 G. Belli: ¿Quienes son los especuladores?’, Barricada, 25 Feb. 1987. Similar doubts about 
the line between commerce, illegal speculation and poor people’s activities were raised by D. 
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After the first adjustment measures, the government’s economic policy 
continued to divide leading Sandinista politicians. The government consulted 
external advisers, among them the US economist Lance Taylor from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Daniel Ibarra Muñoz, the 
former treasury secretary for Mexico, who worked as a consultant for the Comisión 
Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL). By 1988, the Central 
American peace negotiations had advanced to the stage where the Sandinistas 
believed that the conflict could be settled and the time for economic reforms had 
come. Finally, the market and structural adjustment advocates won out.48 
In February 1988, the government introduced a first adjustment package that 
included a 10 per cent budget cut, the dismissal of 8,000 public employees and 
the introduction of a new currency. It soon became apparent that the measures 
were not enough to stop inflation. As people continued to suffer from poor 
supply lines and unaffordable prices, they lost confidence in the government’s 
economic policy. In June 1988, a second adjustment package was implemented 
that devalued the new currency and introduced higher prices for public services, 
wage liberalisation and the elimination of the last food subsidy for milk.49 Still 
the economic situation did not improve. Furthermore, measures to alleviate 
the social crisis had only limited effects.50 In October 1988, Hurricane Joan 
hit the country, an additional blow to the Nicaraguan economy. The hurricane 
shattered the Caribbean coast, causing a total of more than US$839 million 
worth of damage.51
The 1988 adjustment was a radical turning point, as the influence of market 
mechanisms in the mixed economy increased. Simultaneously, the Sandinistas 
reduced the scope of their expansive social policy. A closer look at PAN shows 
that Nicaragua’s food policy was eroded during the transition that began in 1988. 
While PAN’s shrinking number of employees still drew up ambitious plans to 
attract foreign funding, the institutional capacity for their implementation 
was limited. As Harald Juch, a German development cooperation employee 
remembers, the staff lacked nutritional knowledge and showed no interest in 
engaging in public education campaigns any more. At the same time, a large 
corruption scandal affected the programme.52 Similarly, ENABAS adapted to 
Martínez, ‘Reintegrar al trabajo a los especuladores’, Barricada, 26 Feb. 1987, 3.
48 Martínez Cuenca, Sandinista Economies, 69–73.
49 Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 124–5; G. Dijkstra, Industrialization in Sandinista 
Nicaragua: Policy and Practice in a Mixed Economy, 136–9; Anlage 3: Übersicht über die 
Maßnahmen zur weiteren Durchführung der Wirtschaftsreformen, Stand vom 10.10.1988. 
BArch DE 1/58121.
50 To alleviate the social effects of the crisis, the government introduced a wage increase of 500 
per cent, on the face of it a high amount. However, the real wage increase was estimated at 
just 200 per cent as the new wage system eliminated other incentives. Dr Bothe, ZK-Berater, 
Nicaragua an Dr Schürer, Vorsitzender der Staatlichen Planungskommission, 25.2.1988. 
BArch DE 1/58122; Dijkstra, Industrialization in Sandinista Nicaragua, 136–9.
51 CEPAL, ‘Damage caused by Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua’, 3.
52 H. Juch, ‘Unser revolutionärer Alltag: Teil 2’, Tagebuch Comics Zeichnungen Fotos, 
unpublished manuscript, 1989, 7–13.
NICARAGUAN FOOD POLICY 73
market mechanisms and abandoned the goal of equal access to distribution 
points and storage facilities.
The economic crisis reversed the social advances of the early revolutionary 
years. Average caloric intakes for Nicaraguans fell continuously until 1989. 
Between 1976 and 1986, the average per capita caloric intake in Nicaragua had 
ranged between 2,000 and nearly 2,400 kilocalories (kcal). In 1986, it started 
to fall: first to 1,932 kcal in 1987, then to 1,610 kcal in 1988 and finally to 
1,591 kcal in 1989 – a 22.5 per cent decline.53 By 1988, average caloric intakes 
had fallen below 1,800 kcal, which is below the current FAO’s definition of 
hunger.54 Health surveys also indicated that malnutrition among children 
had once again increased.55 Nevertheless, Sandinista leaders refrained from 
mentioning hunger in internal political propaganda, as this would have been a 
public acknowledgement of failure. The economic crisis and the hurricane also 
strongly affected food production.
The devastation caused by Hurricane Joan led to the erosion of 10,000 
hectares of arable land, and destroyed seeds, food processing facilities, warehouses 
and storage units. In total, 15,700 head of cattle, 15,000 pigs and 460,000 head 
of poultry were killed, further adding to the country’s grave meat shortages. 
The CEPAL diagnosed ‘a serious food shortage’ and estimated that agricultural 
production would decline by 17 per cent.56 Moreover, the lack of fertilisers and 
other agricultural inputs mainly affected the large-scale production of rice, milk 
and meat. For example, milk production declined by 64.9 per cent and beef 
production by 38.1 per cent between 1978 and 1989. Rice production had 
increased by 1982, but then fell by 40.8 per cent between 1982 and 1989.57 
Despite increasing the production of corn and beans after 1987 – a marker of the 
success of the new peasant strategy – the overall situation remained disastrous. 
Food aid reached a new peak of more than 185 million tons in 1988. These 
donations temporarily alleviated the situation but could not resolve the supply 
crisis.58 As the Sandinistas realised that wages at state institutions did not allow 
people to make ends meet, they introduced a special aid package guaranteeing 
low-cost basic food to around 190,000 state employees.59 This measure was 
53 Program Briefing Paper for Potential CARE Food Assistance Activities in Nicaragua, 4 
Apr. 1990, Box 1218, CARE Archives. Protein consumption levels ranged from 50.7 to 
56.3 grams (g) between 1976–85, fell to 49.8 g in 1986 and then to 37.6 g in 1989. CARE 
obtained these data from PAN. 
54 FAO defines hunger as the inability of a person to acquire sufficient food for more than a 
year, taking a minimum level of kilocalories as an indicator. The organisation establishes the 
average need at 2,100 kilocalories per person. 
55 As the economic crisis also undermined the state’s capacity to generate reliable data, surveys 
sometimes only cover limited samples, which makes comparisons difficult. 
56 CEPAL, ‘Damage caused by Hurricane Joan in Nicaragua’, 10.
57 Data from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
58 Garst, La ayuda alimentaria al istmo centroamericano, cuadro 15.
59 The AFA (arroz, frijoles, azúcar) package included ten pounds of rice, ten pounds of beans and 
five pounds of sugar per month.
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meant to ensure that government institutions could keep working, but it left 
vulnerable groups unprotected.
Far from Managua, global political changes indicated that aid from the 
Eastern bloc would decline, a fact that local Soviet advisers communicated 
to Sandinista politicians.60 Owing to the crisis Hurricane Joan had left in its 
wake, the government introduced a third adjustment programme in early 1989, 
which drastically slashed state expenditure by 44 per cent. As a consequence, 
the government dismissed a further 35,000 state employees and reduced its 
responsibility for state enterprises.61 During the peace process negotiations in 
February 1989, the Sandinistas agreed to bring the national elections forward 
to February 1990, meaning that 1989 became a pre-electoral period. In their 
election campaign the opposition argued that the United States would revive 
economic aid if they were to win, thereby improving the prospects for the 
Nicaraguan economy.62 To counter this, Sandinista political propaganda claimed 
that Soviet support would definitely continue, even though the leadership 
knew this was not the case. Sandinista politicians continued to honour Soviet 
diplomats with reception ceremonies for donations, even as the political 
transformation of the Eastern bloc began.63
Contemporary surveys on adjustment policies indicate Nicaraguans’ growing 
disillusionment and discontent. For example, the ITZANI research institute 
interviewed more than a thousand people in five Managuan districts in spring 
1989. Two-thirds perceived their personal economic situation to be worse than the 
year before. Only 20 per cent viewed the economic policy as good, with more than 
70 per cent expressing a critical opinion: 24 per cent judged the situation as bad, 
14 per cent as terrible and 36 per cent as indifferent. Finally, 25 per cent believed 
that the government was unwilling to find a solution for the country’s economic 
problems.64 The poor economic situation, combined with people’s desire for peace, 
contributed to the Sandinista electoral defeat.
Overall, Sandinista food policy embarked on a course to becoming more 
self-sufficient, but faced a dependency dilemma. Given the scarcity of resources, 
the promotion of basic grain production would have weakened the agro-export 
sector which generated foreign exchange. Hence, the Sandinistas followed an 
alternative course which also reflected the existence of different factions within 
government institutions. Visions of giant state enterprises producing food proved 
unsuccessful, while peasants’ expectations that they would receive individual 
landholdings were fulfilled too late. After the shift to peasant production and the 
liberalisation of basic grain prices in the mid 1980s, the production of corn and 
60 D.M. Ferrero Blanco, ‘Daniel Ortega y Mijail Gorbachov: Nicaragua y la URSS en los 
últimos anos de la Guerra Fría (1985–1990)’.
61 Ricciardi, ‘Economic policy’, 266–7.
62 Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years, 126.
63 Barricada, ‘Llega embarque de arroz URSS a San Juan del Sur’, 24 Jan. 1990, 6.
64 J.W. Soule, ‘The economic austerity packages of 1988 and their impact on public opinion’, 
International Journal of Political Economy, Fall (1990).
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beans did increase. However, this success came too late and was too limited to 
guarantee the growing Nicaraguan population access to basic food. This failure 
undermined the government’s campaigns to strengthen the consumption of local 
food.
After the 1990 elections, the deepening social crisis and occasional price 
shocks continued to affect the Nicaraguan people. By 1992 some 50 per cent 
of the population was suffering from malnutrition. The UNO (National 
Opposition Union) government led by President Violeta Chamorro (1990–7) 
followed a neoliberal economic policy that was supported by a new influx of 
US economic aid and the cooperation of international financial organisations. 
Although the nutritional situation was severe, the food policy of the Chamorro 
government was left at the margins. International organisations, such as the 
FAO, criticised the strong external dependency of the Nicaraguan food 
system.65 A limited number of Sandinista projects were continued by NGOs 
in the 1990s, while agricultural organisations fought to improve the situation 
in the countryside. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, food policy focused 
on fighting the consequences of Hurricane Mitch, which hit the country in 
1998 and caused another food crisis. Corruption scandals discredited ENABAS 
and President Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) exploited food aid for electoral 
purposes.66
Although initially the FSLN deeply opposed the UNO government, after a 
year it had taken a more conciliatory stance. By the late 1990s, the FSLN had 
already abandoned its aim of revolutionary change and entered into an alliance 
with the governing Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC), which can only be 
explained by the profound transformation of the party throughout the 1990s. 
Some of the FSLN leadership joined the country’s economic elite by taking 
control of state property during the political transition, a process commonly 
known as the piñata.67
In 2006, thanks to electoral reforms established during the pact period, 
Daniel Ortega won the elections with 38 per cent of the vote and once again 
became president. Researchers have characterised his second presidency as a new 
caudillismo or a ‘populist left regime with hybrid economic features’.68 Contrary 
to other left-wing Latin American governments, Ortega has maintained more 
institutional continuity and refrained from a strong redistributive policy, 
eschewing nationalisation, land reform or price controls.69 Nevertheless, 
65 FAO, Representación en Nicaragua, ‘Informe Anual: Julio 92 a Junio 93’, 1–2; FAO, 
Representación en Nicaragua, ‘Informe Anual: Julio/94 a Junio/95’, 10–11.
66 Nitlápan–Envío Team, ‘Time for a pact or time for a reflection?’, Envío, no. 204, July 1998; 
J.L. Rocha and I. Cristoplos, ‘Las ONGs ante los desastres naturales: vacíos y oportunidades’, 
Envío, no. 212, Nov. 1999.
67 A. Pérez Baltodano, ‘Political culture’; Ramírez, Adiós Muchachos, 32; A. Zamora, 
‘Some reflections on the piñata’, Envío, no. 180, July 1996.
68 Spalding, Contesting Trade, 208.
69 Ibid., 208–10. 
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his government initiated an anti-poverty policy that was much broader than 
previous governments’ efforts. The new government’s package included programs 
such as Zero Usury and Zero Hunger. The basis for this policy was Nicaragua’s 
new alliance with ALBA-TCP (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra 
América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos),70 whose funding permitted the 
expansive social policy. Ortega’s new allies put fewer restrictions on economic 
aid than European donors, who limited their support after Ortega’s 2011 
unconstitutional re-election.71
Continuity and change in Sandinista food policy
The new Ortega government’s food programmes display some similarities with 
those of the 1980s – rhetorically at least. The government included an urban 
gardening project in its national development plan, reactivated ENABAS and 
continued the corn festivals. Some continuities with the 1980s food projects 
do exist, for example, ENABAS launched a ‘Food for the People’ project with 
the aim of establishing a just market system.72 However, I argue that the heart 
of 1980s Sandinista food policy has not been restored: food subsidies, price 
regulations and land distribution are absent from the new programmes. More 
importantly, the neo-Sandinistas have made no attempt to break with the 
capitalist economy. Thus far, public debates and research have focused on the 
Zero Hunger Program and the food sovereignty law, because these initiatives are 
embedded within broader regional or global political initiatives. No systematic 
evaluation of Nicaraguan food politics has been made since 2006, so what 
follows is a broad summary of the most important trends until 2016.
The 1980s Sandinista food policy laid the groundwork for the food 
sovereignty debate by prioritising locally produced food and demanding the 
right to shape the local food system. Furthermore, the Sandinista Revolution 
left a legacy of active peasant organisations mobilising for change and debating 
agrarian issues. During the 1980s, these peasant organisations and conferences 
on agrarian reforms established a process of exchange that favoured the rise of the 
LVC (the transnational peasant movement), with the Asociación de Trabajadores 
en el Campo (ATC) and the Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos 
(UNAG) as founding members.73 In 1997, Sandinista deputy Dora Zeledón 
launched the first initiative for a food security law. The proposal rejected the 
70 The alliance was founded in 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba as an alternative to the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA). The two nations agreed on terms for the petroleum trade and 
intensified exchanges in the areas of health and education. Later, Bolivia in 2006, Nicaragua 
in 2007, Ecuador in 2009 and several Caribbean nations joined ALBA.
71 S. Martí i Puig and D. Close, ‘The Nicaraguan exception?’, 299–300. E.g., Denmark ended 
bilateral development cooperation with Nicaragua in 2012, while other countries, such as 
Germany and Finland, announced their intention to evaluate and reduce their programmes.
72 Alianza de los pequeños productores organizados, con ENABAS y los CPC, ‘Creación de Red 
de Mercado Justo’, 2007.
73 W. Godek, ‘Challenges for food sovereignty policy making: the case of Nicaragua’s law 693’.
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perception of food as merchandise and suggested that 50 per cent of Nicaragua’s 
food supply should be provided by national production. Food aid distribution, 
which the law considered to be ‘unfair competition’ for local production, would 
be limited to exceptional supply crises resulting from natural disasters and other 
unforeseen events.74 In the years after 1997, although the initial proposal was 
modified several times, the government of President Enrique Bolaños (2002–7) 
remained unwilling to pass the legislation.
In Nicaragua, the concept of food sovereignty gained traction after the 
2001 World Forum on Food Sovereignty. From then on, LVC member 
organisations began to discuss a new initiative for a food sovereignty law. In 
2004, 40 organisations from Nicaraguan civil society founded the Grupo de 
Interés Soberanía y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (GISSAN) to promote 
the law. As that name indicates, the debate over concepts continued among the 
initiative’s supporters, because the term ‘food security’ seemed more familiar and 
concrete to many of them. In 2005, GISSAN member organisations worked on 
a new draft for a law that Deputy Wálmaro Gutiérrez (FSLN) introduced to the 
National Assembly in 2006.75 When the National Assembly discussed the law in 
June 2007, the new Ortega government was already in power.
With Ortega’s electoral victory, it seemed more likely that the law would 
be approved. However, the legislation prompted contentious discussions and 
National Assembly deputies rejected the law during its second reading. The 
private sector was particularly opposed to Article 5, which prohibited imports 
of genetically modified food. The business community feared that the law would 
also affect the implementation of the Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA) and convinced PLC members to oppose the project. After the first 
initiative failed in 2007, the FAO joined the effort and the law project was 
deradicalised. Those articles which permitted the creation of grain reserves 
and price regulations were eliminated from the draft legislation. In addition, 
Article 9 of the law clearly established that state policies should not touch free 
enterprise and commerce, which meant a surrender to market mechanisms.76 
The deradicalisation of the law reflected the government’s interest in avoiding 
further conflicts with the private sector and the IMF. While discussions about 
the legislation continued, the government launched the Zero Hunger Program 
as a core element of its anti-poverty policy.
The Zero Hunger Program has generated a contentious debate as critics 
accused the Sandinistas of political favouritism. Its name was inspired by 
the Brazilian ‘Fome Zero’ programme. Launched in 2003 by President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, the programme included cash transfers for poor families, 
favourable interest rates for family farmers and a school meals programme. The 
74 Asamblea Nacional de la República de Nicaragua, ‘Iniciativa de ley “Ley de Seguridad 
Alimentaria”’, unpublished manuscript, 1998.
75 Godek, ‘The institutionalization of food sovereignty’, 175–81. 
76 B. Müller, ‘The loss of harmony: FAO guidance for food security in Nicaragua’; Godek, 
‘Challenges for food sovereignty policy making’.
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Nicaraguan project, however, had a narrower focus, mainly providing peasants 
with the necessary basic inputs for food production. It distributed a package of 
animals, seeds and construction materials worth US$2,000 to 75,000 peasant 
families. Critics bemoaned the programme’s lack of transparency with regard 
to the selection of beneficiaries, as well as the fact that it was not incorporated 
into a broader strategy against malnutrition. A 2007/2008 evaluation suggests 
that the selection criteria for the programme were too vague, allowing political 
considerations to play a role, which in turn led to regions in Central Nicaragua 
such as Masaya being favoured.77 The question of whether the focus on peasant 
farmers was the result of lessons learned in the 1980s, or simply an attempt to 
jump on the bandwagon of the Brazilian initiative, remains the subject of further 
research.78
Efforts to revive 1980s projects are also visible in food distribution and urban 
gardening. The state distribution agency ENABAS resisted privatisation during 
the 1990s, but its capacities were significantly reduced. The neo-Sandinista 
government revived the enterprise and started reconstructing food storage 
facilities with ALBA funding. In addition, ENABAS launched the Programa 
Nacional de Distribución de Alimentos para el pueblo, which aimed to create 
a new network of state distribution points. According to the enterprise’s 
homepage, it has founded more than 3,800 distribution points in about a 
hundred Nicaraguan municipalities.79 However, no systematic research has been 
conducted on the programme’s effects.
Three years after taking over government, the Sandinistas also relaunched 
urban gardening projects. Starting in 2010, with two projects in Los Laureles 
district in Managua and Ciudad Sandino, the so-called Healthy Backyard 
Program was incorporated into the national development plan for 2012 
to 2016.80 During that period, the idea was that 250,000 gardens would be 
involved throughout the country. The gardening projects also aimed at increasing 
fruit and vegetable consumption. Evaluations by geographer Laura Shillington 
demonstrate that local inhabitants sometimes disagreed with international 
project staff about which plants would be most beneficial for their gardens.81
The idea of strengthening local food consumption is also visible at the corn 
festivals. After the Sandinista defeat these festivals had continued at the regional 
level and became more touristy. In Jalapa and Matagalpa, especially, the tradition 
remained strong. Between 2005 and 2015 their mottoes have emphasised 
77 P. Kester, Informe evaluativo (2007–2008): Programa Productivo Alimentario (PPA) ‘Hambre 
Cero’, 17; Spalding, ‘Poverty politics’.
78 Rose Spalding argues that the government launched the Zero Hunger Program having 
possibly learned from its experiences in the 1980s. Ibid., 233.
79 https://web.archive.org/web/20170426210719/http://www.enabas.gob.ni/enabas (accessed 
on 2 July 2019).
80 FAO, ‘Urban and peri-urban agriculture in Latin America and the Caribbean: Managua’.
81 L.J. Shillington, ‘Right to food, right to the city: household urban agriculture, 
and socionatural metabolism in Managua’.
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Nicaragua’s role as a significant corn producer, for example ‘La gran milpa de 
Nicaragua’ (2008) or ‘Jalapa con su maíz … orgullo de mi país!’ (2009).82 At the 
2011 corn festival in Matagalpa, the local FSLN mayor clearly favoured the 
food sovereignty movement. He argued staunchly that it was necessary to rescue 
Nicaraguan culinary traditions for future generations, and that its food was a 
patrimonial value of Nicaraguan culture and formed part of the country’s food 
sovereignty.83 After 1999, corn production increased significantly, peaking in 
2003, and fluctuating between 443,700 and 545,938 tons in the following years.84
In the last two decades, basic grain production has increased, reducing the 
dependency of the Nicaraguan food system on external sources. In 2011/2012, 
Nicaragua was among the least dependent Central American countries in terms 
of basic grain trade.85 However, per capita food availability decreased after 2004 
owing to low yields, which could create further supply problems in the future.86 
Compared to the early 1990s, the nutritional situation in Nicaragua has 
improved considerably in the last two decades. Rates of malnutrition fell from 50 
per cent (1990–2) to 38 per cent (1995–7) to 25 per cent (2000–2). According 
to recent FAO data, the situation has improved further with a reduction in 
malnutrition from 22.3 per cent in 2007 to 16.6 per cent in 2015.87 However, 
undernourishment is still a major problem. Between 2009 and 2013, an average 
of 23 per cent of Nicaraguan children suffered from chronic malnutrition.88 
In rural areas, the situation remains depressing, with poverty rates exceeding 50 
per cent.89
Conclusion
The Sandinista Revolution established ambitious aims: to break with export 
dependency, democratise access to food and guarantee all Nicaraguans a basic 
supply of food. In the early revolutionary years, the government and mass 
organisations designed creative campaigns, which mobilised thousands of 
people, with the goal of ensuring local food security. The Sandinista policy also 
gained the support of international organisations, such as the FAO, WHO 
82 El Nuevo Diario, ‘Preparan feria del maíz en Jalapa’, 28 Aug. 2008; El Nuevo Diario, 
‘Jalapa con su maíz... orgulllo de Nicaragua’, 17 Sept. 2009.
83 Transcription from my sound recording at the event, Apr. 2011.
84 Statistics from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/home/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019). The peak 
production in 2003 was 588,599 tons, followed by 443,730 tons in 2004 and 545,938 tons 
in 2013.
85 FAO, ‘Panorama de la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en América Latina y el Caribe 
2011: altos precios de los alimentos: oportunidades y riesgos’, 2011, 63–6.
86 G. Bornemann et al., ‘Desafíos desde la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional en Nicaragua’, 34.
87 Statistics from FAOSTAT, http://faostat3.fao.org/browse/D/FS/E (accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
88 Unicef, ‘At a glance: Nicaragua’, www.unicef.org/infobycountry/nicaragua_statistics.html 
(accessed 23 Apr. 2019).
89 INIDE, ‘Results of the National Households Survey on Measurement of Level of Life, 2014’, 
2015, http://www.inide.gob.ni/Emnv/Emnv14/Poverty%20Results%202014.pdf (accessed 
23 Apr. 2019).
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and UNICEF. In addition, bilateral development cooperation fostered many 
revolutionary projects to increase food production. However, these ambitious 
plans faced enormous challenges because of the dependency of the Nicaraguan 
economy on agro exports, war and the economic blockade. Moreover, Sandinista 
agrarian policy remained contradictory. Until the mid 1980s, it promoted large-
scale, modern agriculture, while giving peasants less support. This was one of 
the reasons why basic grain production did not expand as rapidly as it should 
have done.
Within the Central American context of the early 1980s, Nicaragua’s food 
policy, with its strong focus on self-sufficiency, was exceptional. Looking at other 
Global South countries, however, it is possible to identify similarities with the 
Nicaraguan approach. After attaining political independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, many Asian and African countries developed self-sufficiency projects. 
Political independence was linked to economic independence and control of 
food resources. As in Nicaragua, these countries struggled to find a balance 
between self-sufficiency, food aid and Green Revolution strategies. Research on 
these self-sufficiency projects has not yet been completed, and it is not clear 
whether experts from the international nutrition community were involved 
in these efforts. The evidence for Nicaragua indicates that, starting from the 
early 1980s, international organisations and bilateral support from individual 
countries influenced strategic decision-making about food policy.
Nicaragua is a prime example of the many small countries with dependent 
economies in the Global South that experienced regime changes and became 
Cold War hotspots in the 20th century. After 1979, experts from both Cold 
War blocs struggled for influence over Sandinista politics in different areas. 
Products from both fronts of the Cold War entered Nicaraguan territory in the 
form of food aid, a phenomenon that was extensive in Central America but also 
happened in other Global South countries.
During a short honeymoon period, international organisations and NGOs 
promoted Nicaragua as a model for food policy in the Global South, and 
Nicaragua disseminated proposals for self-sufficiency and regional food security 
alliances at international conferences. These ambitious projects, however, faced 
serious economic limitations: the nation’s dependency on agro exports generated 
conflicts around resources, basic grain production did not expand sufficiently, 
and tensions weakened the relationship between Sandinistas and the peasants.
By 1985, the Nicaraguan economy had entered a severe crisis and the supply 
situation became steadily worse. Because of this, the Sandinista government 
had to rely increasingly on food imports and aid, which undermined the self-
sufficiency project. The reliance on donations also implied a growing surrender 
to the donors’ political agendas, visible in the numerous reception ceremonies 
for food aid. With the 1988 adjustment programmes, the ambitious food policy 
was completely eroded. The financial crisis reversed state institutions’ capacity 
to store food, manage the incoming donations, and implement the projects 
financed by external donors. Simultaneously, the strengthening of market 
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mechanisms reversed the democratisation of the food distribution network. 
Finally, the failure of the Sandinistas to guarantee a stable basic food supply 
during the crisis years contributed significantly to its electoral defeat in 1990. In 
the early 1990s, the UNO government neglected food policy, despite widespread 
malnutrition. At the same time, the food system remained highly dependent on 
imports whose lower prices harmed local food producers who were unable to 
compete.
However, the Sandinistas Revolution left an active network of peasant 
organisations that continued to mobilise for social change. They contributed 
to the campaign for a food sovereignty law in the early 2000s. The close 
collaboration between the Sandinistas and FAO in the 1980s had introduced 
the principle of food security into Nicaraguan politics. Later on, important 
elements of the Sandinista food policy were taken up by the food sovereignty 
movement, such as the priority for locally produced food, agrarian reform and 
the autonomous definition of the local food system. After the 2001 World 
Forum on Food Sovereignty, the issues of food security and food sovereignty 
were debated intensely in Nicaragua. With the FSLN electoral victory, favourable 
conditions for the proposed legislation seemed to have arrived, but in the event, 
the law was passed in a watered-down form.
Although names and rhetoric are similar, the framework for neo-Sandinista 
food policy differs from that of the 1980s. While the Sandinistas based their 
policy on the idea of a mixed economy, the Ortega government and the new 
Sandinista economic elites have accepted capitalism and adapted their policies 
accordingly, taking care not to endanger agreements with the IMF or violate 
CAFTA rules. Unlike other Latin American left-wing governments, the Ortega 
government has not embarked on profound changes in economic structures 
or land distribution. Nevertheless, social policy is a higher priority than it was 
for previous Nicaraguan governments. In fact, poverty and malnutrition from 
2005 to 2015 decreased significantly. Moreover, Nicaragua has become less 
dependent on grain imports than other Central American countries. However, 
reliance on external sources is still a problem: the Ortega government changed 
the country’s foreign alliances, which created a dependency on ALBA funding. 
The deep economic crisis in Venezuela has made ALBA support more uncertain, 
which might also endanger the neo-Sandinistas’ social policy. Because of this, 
malnutrition could rise again, given Nicaragua’s vulnerability to natural disasters, 
dependency on volatile external resources and low basic grains productivity.
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